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COMMENT
Federal Maritime Commission v.
South Carolina Ports Authority
JUDICIAL INCURSIONS INTO EXECUTIVE POWER*
I. INTRODUCTION
In a 2002 decision, Federal Maritime Commission v.
South Carolina Ports Authority,' the Supreme Court affirmed
the Fourth Circuit's dismissal of a judgment against a state
port authority by an independent federal agency.2 In so doing,
the Court expanded the doctrine of state sovereignty, which
has ballooned in scope and application in recent years,' into the
area of executive action. Without passing on the nature of the
power used by federal agencies when they adjudicate, the
Supreme Court held that the constitutional principle of state
sovereignty precludes an agency adjudication when a private
citizen initiates proceedings against a state, even though the
agency chose to adjudicate whether the state had violated a
valid federal law.' This Comment will argue that the Court
© 2004 Greg Wicker. All Rights Reserved.
Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002).
2 S.C. State Ports Auth. v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 243 F.3d 165 (4th Cir. 2001).
3 See infra Part II.A. See also Mark D. Falkoff, Abrogating State Sovereign
Immunity in Legislative Courts, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 853 (2001) (arguing that the
Supreme Court has broadened state immunity from suits by private individuals in a
manner that "contravenes" the rule of law).
Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 747. The Federal Maritime commission
chose to clarify the application of the Shipping Act through adjudication rather than




should not have extended the doctrine of sovereign immunity,
itself of problematic provenance, to cover proceedings within an
independent agency. Although the sovereign immunity doctrine
may be relatively ineffectual to advance the goals of
federalism,5 the ability of the doctrine to erode legislative and
executive programs for enforcement of federal laws is
considerable. The Court should impose such impediments to
federal programs only if it can articulate a less problematic
constitutional basis for state sovereignty than it has or if it is
willing to locate judicial power in the federal agencies when
they adjudicate.
Part II of this Comment examines the historical
evolution of the doctrine of state sovereign immunity in
Supreme Court jurisprudence, describes the factual
background of Federal Maritime Commission and describes the
case's movement through the courts. Part III explores the
hybrid nature of federal agency adjudication and asks whether
an agency exercises judicial power when it adjudicates a claim
by a private party. Part IV discusses general criticisms of the
sovereign immunity doctrine. Part V looks at the principles
underlying the Court's current vision of federalism, questions
whether the sovereignty doctrine fits coherently within the
Court's federalist jurisprudence, and suggests that the present
conception of sovereign immunity is problematic from the
federalist perspective. Finally, Part VI argues that, with
respect to agency adjudication, the question of divisions of
power between the federal branches of government should
predominate over the question of sovereign immunity. The
sovereignty analysis fits the issue of agency adjudication poorly
because agency adjudication primarily serves the function of
implementing and refining federal executive policy, as opposed
to Article III courts which primarily serve to redress individual
grievances. The Comment ultimately concludes that while the
federalism concerns underlying the doctrine of sovereign
immunity may justify circumscription of certain kinds of
agency adjudicative procedures, they do not warrant an
absolute bar against private complaints.
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist
Court's Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429 (2002) (arguing in part that the
state sovereignty doctrine is a cumbersome mechanism for federalist reform).
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II. THE BACKGROUND OF FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION
A. Background of State Immunity from Suit
The dispute in Federal Maritime Commission is the
product of a largely contemporary resurgence of concern over
the amenability of states to suit. The early Supreme Court
initially showed little regard for the principle of state
sovereignty. However, the issue was quickly framed by the
court for the first time. In Chisholm v. Georgia the Court found
that it had jurisdiction over a suit by a South Carolina citizen
against the state of Georgia for the debt the state had incurred
to him during the Revolutionary War.' The national outrage
over this vulnerability of states to private suit led to the
ratification in 1798 of the Eleventh Amendment, the text of
which prohibits citizens of one state from bringing suit in
federal court against another state.'
For almost one hundred years, the Eleventh
Amendment appeared to apply only to negate the specific
Article III, section 2 grant of diversity jurisdiction to federal
courts over cases where a state was sued by a citizen of another
state. The issue of jurisdiction became more complicated in
1890 with Hans v. Lousiana, which extended the Eleventh
Amendment's prohibition of subject matter jurisdiction to
citizens' suits against their own state Many observers have
since regarded the Hans decision as an overbroad
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment Twenty years later
the Court somewhat narrowed Hans with an exception it
formulated in Ex parte Young."° In Young, the Court authorized
citizens of one state to sue an official of another state, if not the
state itself, when the official acted beyond his constitutional
authority and when the plaintiff sought only injunctive relief."
6 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
7 "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend
to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S.
CONST. amend. XI.
8 Hans v. Lousiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
For an in-depth treatment of the criticisms, see Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The
Particularly Dubious Case Of Hans v. Louisiana: An Essay On Law, Race, History, And
Federal Courts, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1927 (2003). See also infra note 20 and accompanying
text.




Over time the Court carved out further areas in which
the Eleventh Amendment would not preclude suits against a
state or its employees. For example, the Court permitted
private suits against states when such suits were grounded in a
law enacted pursuant to Congress's Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement power,'" which was seen to override the Eleventh
Amendment because ratified afterward with the purpose of
expanding federal power over the states. 3 However, the Court
tried to reduce the possibility of a proliferation of suits by
requiring an explicit congressional intent to abrogate state
sovereign immunity and thereby to give citizens the right to
sue a state under any given statute.
14
The current Court undertook its project of expanding
the doctrine of state sovereignty with Seminole Tribe v.
Florida.'" Seminole Tribe overruled an earlier decision holding
that Congress could authorize suits for money damages under
the Commerce Clause."6 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
Court, held that Congress had no constitutional power to
abrogate state sovereign immunity under any portion of the
Commerce Clause.'7 Seminole Tribe unequivocally established
the principle that Congress could not use Article I powers to
circumvent the Eleventh Amendment's restrictions on Article
III jurisdiction. In his dissent, Justice Stevens noted that the
majority's holding would preclude Congress from providing a
federal forum for a "broad range of actions against States,"
including bankruptcy, environmental law, and economic
regulation." He argued that the Court's holding contravened a
consistent Supreme Court position established in Hans that
Congress could create a cause of action against a state in any
area within Congress's Article I powers."
12 Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (permitting suit, even for
retrospective damages, based on law enacted pursuant to Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement power).
" See Seminole Tribe v. United States, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996) (quoting
Fitzpatrick., 427 U.S. at 455) ("[T]he Fourteenth Amendment, by expanding federal
power at the expense of state autonomy, had fundamentally altered the balance of
state and federal power struck by the Constitution.").
14 Atascadeo State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) ("Congress
may abrogate the States' constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court
only by making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.").
15 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
'6 Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
17 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
'8 Id. at 77 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
'9 Id. at 76-77 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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The Court continued to expand the reach of the state
sovereign immunity doctrine in Alden v. Maine, which held
that Congress could not compel states to entertain suits
against them by their own citizens within their own state
courts." In Alden, the Court developed the rationale underlying
state sovereignty more fully than it had in any previous case.
The Court pronounced that "the immunity of the States neither
derives from, nor is limited by, the terms of the Eleventh
Amendment" so that the literal language of the Eleventh
Amendment was irrelevant in determining the scope of the
immunity.2
Instead, the majority opinion in Alden characterized the
sovereign immunity from suit retained by the states as pre-
constitutional, its parameters defined in reference to the
sovereignty of the British Crown." The Court characterized any
state's non-consensual appearance to defend against a private
complaint as an affront to the state's dignity, and regardless of
the forum, such "coercive process" was inimical to state
sovereignty as imbedded in the Constitution.23
Although many commentators have described the
Court's current state sovereignty jurisprudence as mystifying
or suspicious," state sovereign immunity has clearly taken root
in the philosophies of a small majority of Justices sitting on the
Court today and continues to play a large part in the Rehnquist
Court's case selection.25 The disposition of Federal Maritime
20 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
21 Id. at 713.
22 Id. at 715.
23 Id. at 749 (quoting Exparte Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887)).
24 See, e.g., Louise Weinberg, Of Sovereignty and Union: The Legends of
Alden, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV 1113, 1118 (2001) ('[T]he Alden/Seminole/Hans
dispensation is and has been both intellectually unfounded and unjust."); David L.
Shapiro, The 1999 Trilogy: What is Good Federalism?, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 753, 753-54
(2000) (contending that Alden relied on "ambiguous" history and that the Alden line of
cases had no textual support in the constitution); James G. Wilson, The Eleventh
Amendment Cases: Going "Too Far" with Judicial Neofederalism, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1687, 1688-89 ("Eleventh Amendment doctrine contains . . . confusing outcomes that
are even less comprehensible now that the doctrine has become so broad and
dynamic.").
25 Among the cases on the Court's docket in 2001 and 2002 were: Nevada
Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (considering whether Congress had
power under the Fourteenth amendment to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity from suit by individuals under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993),
Raygor v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533 (2002) (holding that federal
supplemental jurisdiction statute does not toll claims reasserted in state court if the
claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment ), Jinks v. Richland Co., 538 U.S. 456
(2003) (considering whether the same tolling provision is an unconstitutional violation
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Commission itself provides evidence that the Court has not
exhausted its development of the doctrine. In Federal Maritime
Commission the Court treats federal agency adjudication as
another "forum," under the Alden"6 rubric, to which the literal
language of the Eleventh Amendment is of little relevance and
the tableau of an indignant state forced to entertain the
petition of a private party looms large."
B. The Facts and History of Federal Maritime Commission
The dispute underlying Federal Maritime Commission
arose when South Carolina Maritime Services, Inc. (Maritime
Services) filed a complaint with the Federal Maritime
Commission against the South Carolina State Ports Authority
(Ports Authority) for repeatedly denying permission to berth a
cruise ship in the Port of Charleston.' In refusing to grant
permission, the Ports Authority cited its own policy against
giving berthing space to ships run primarily for gambling
purposes.' Maritime Services' complaint alleged that the Ports
Authority policy violated the Shipping Act because the Ports
Authority had "unduly and unreasonably preferred" another
shipping line, Carnival Cruise Ships, in violation of section
1709(d) of the Shipping Act. and the complaint also sought
reparations under section 1710(a) of the act for loss of profits,
and other losses. °
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) for the Federal
Maritime Commission granted the Ports Authority's motion to
dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds. 1  The Federal
Maritime Commission decided, on its own motion, to review the
of state sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment and the Necessary and Proper
Clause), Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Service Comm'n of Maryland, 535 U.S. 635
(2002) (permitting private suits against state for injunctive relief authorized under
specific federal law), and Paul D. Lapides v. Board of Regents of University System of
Georgia, 535 U.S. 613 (2002) (holding that state waived its Eleventh Amendment
immunity when it consented to suit in state court and subsequently removed to federal
court).
26 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
27 See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760
n.11 (2002) ("One... could argue that allowing a private party to haul a State in front
of... an administrative tribunal constitutes a greater insult to a State's dignity than
requiring a State to appear in an Article III court....").
28 Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 747-48 (2002).
2 Id. at 747.
30 Id. at 748.
31 S.C. Mar. Servs., Inc. v. S.C. State Ports Auth., No. 99-21, 2000 WL
359791, at *2 (F.M.C. Mar. 23, 2000).
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dismissal due to "the importance of the sovereign immunity
question to the Commission's ability to determine whether
state-operated ports are acting in compliance with the
provisions of the Shipping Act."32 Furthermore, the Federal
Maritime Commission held that the adjudication did not
trigger sovereign immunity.3  The Federal Maritime
Commission's decision noted that recent Supreme Court
decisions expanding the doctrine of state sovereignty had not
included adjudicative proceedings by administrative agencies
within the "definition" of state sovereignty. 4 According to the
Federal Maritime Commission, there was no compelling reason
to extend the doctrine to cover "executive branch
administrative agencies."" Although its decision expressed a
belief that a Commission could order to a state to pay
reparations for injury to a private complainant, the Federal
Maritime Commission found that regardless of whether
reparations were available, Commission findings that a state
agency violated the Shipping Act were necessary to determine
the parameters of the Act and to establish precedent for future
violations.3
The Ports Authority appealed the ruling to the Fourth
Circuit, which reversed and held that sovereign immunity did
apply to agency adjudications. 7 The court enlisted Seminole
Tribe's vision of state sovereign immunity transcending the
literal text of the Eleventh Amendment, and cited the
statement in Alden that the "'indignity of subjecting a State to
the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of
private parties'" barred private proceedings against a state
"'regardless of the forum.' 38 It found that these prior cases
compelled the view that sovereign immunity barred any
privately initiated proceeding against a non-consenting
sovereign."
The court further held that the language of the
Eleventh Amendment covering "judicial power" and "suit in
32 Id.
" Id. at *6.
3 Id. at *3.
3. Id. at *4.
36 S.C. Mar. Servs., 2000 WL 359791 at *6.
31 S.C. State Ports Auth. v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 243 F.3d 165 (2001).
38 Id. at 168-70 (quoting Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44, 58 (1996), and Alden,
527 U.S. 706, 749 (1999)).
" Id. at 169.
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law or in equity" was irrelevant to the principle of sovereign
immunity, even if an agency did not exercise "judicial power" in
the Article III sense or call its proceedings a "lawsuit."40 The
court then ruled that none of the six Alden exceptions to state
sovereign immunity applied, and also refused to create a new
exception for maritime matters.41
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the
Court of Appeals' judgment by a narrow vote of five to four.42 In
its affirmation, the Court began with a defense of dual
sovereignty and stated that the principle of state sovereignty
was prevalent at the time of the ratification of the Constitution
and that the ratification "did not disturb States' immunity from
private suits, thus firmly enshrining this principle in our
constitutional framework."' The Court held that regardless of
whether Federal Maritime Commission adjudications involved
exercises of "judicial power,"" sovereign immunity extended to
agency adjudication because the Federal Maritime Commission
proceedings resembled civil litigation and inflicted the same
degree of offense to the "dignity that is consistent with [states']
status as sovereign entities."4' Furthermore, the "dignity and
respect due sovereign entities" barred Congress from
authorizing the Federal Maritime Commission to adjudicate a
claim against the state at all, whether or not the relief sought
was prospective or retrospective, injunctive or for reparations."
III. FEDERAL AGENCIES AND JUDICIAL POWER
A. Supreme Court Case Law
Before appraising the Court's holding that agency
adjudication of a private party claim against a non-consenting
40 Id. at 171-74.
41 Id. at 176-78. The exceptions to state immunity are (1) when a state
consents to a suit; (2) when the United States or another state brings suit against a
state; (3) when a case is brought pursuant to Congress' Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement power; (4) when a private party brings suit against municipal corporations
or other "lesser entities" that are not an "arm of the state"; (5) when a private party
sues state officers "in their official capacity to prevent ongoing violations of the law";
and (6) when private suits are brought against "state officers in their individual
capacity for ultra vires conduct fairly attributable to the officers themselves." Id.
42 Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. 743 (2002).
43 Id. at 751-52.
" Id. at 754.
41 Id. at 759-60.
46 Id. at 769.
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state is unconstitutional, it is useful to probe deeper into the
nature of agency adjudication and what kind of constitutional
powers an agency brings to bear in adjudicating a complaint.
Federal agencies clearly operate outside of Article III to some
extent, but the issue of whether some portion of their power is
derived from the grant of "judicial power" in the Constitution
has not yet been settled conclusively. 7
Federal agencies may act in either of two ways: by
formulating and issuing rules or by issuing orders as a result of
adjudicatory proceedings.4' In the orthodox formulation, federal
agencies derive their rule-making power through a
congressional delegation of legislative power.' Congress
allocates to agencies the power to adjudicate certain claims
within the agency's competence, but to a greater extent than
delegation of legislative power, the allocation of judicial power
by Congress triggers a constitutional separation-of-powers
problem.' Ultimately, Congress cannot give agencies an
adjudicatory power that "diminishes the 'essential attributes"
of the judiciary, but when agency orders are made subject to
judicial review, many proceedings which would otherwise take
place in Article III courts may be committed to agency
adjudication." Finally, an agency like the Federal Maritime
Commission may be characterized as exercising an executive
power to enforce a law enacted by Congress when it
adjudicates. 2
The Supreme Court itself has vacillated when
identifying contexts in which "cases and controversies" may be
heard in federal tribunals outside the federal judiciary, but it
has always permitted some adjudicative proceedings to be
conducted outside of Article III courts. In American Insurance
Co. v. Canters the Court held that Congress may create non-
Article III courts for proceedings in federal territories, which
utilize, rather than judicial power, a power "conferred by
47 PETER M. SHANE & HAROLD H. BRUFF, SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 148 (1996) ("[Tlhe jurisprudence of article III remains in flux.").
48 JACOB A. STEIN ET AL., 4-31 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 31.01 (2004).
49 See generally A.C. AMAN, JR. & W.T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, § 1.1
(1st ed. 1993).
50 Id. § 5.1, at 121.
51 Id. at § 5.1, at 135-37 (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v.
Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850 (1986)).
52 SHANE & BRUFF, supra note 47, at 142.
26 U.S. 511 (1828).
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Congress" in execution of its "general powers."' Murray's
Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co." established a
"public rights" doctrine that allowed Congress to assign
adjudicatory powers to non-Article III tribunals for private
actions against the federal government "in connection with the
performance of the constitutional functions of the executive or
legislative departments."' The "public rights" doctrine
continued to play a significant role in determining the
legitimacy of legislative courts for many years." In Commodity
Futures Trading Commission v. Schor6 the Court began
characterizing agency adjudication as "quasi-judicial"; it set up
a balancing test to determine whether "delegation of
adjudicative functions to a non-Article III body" is
constitutional "by reference to the purposes underlying the
requirements of Article III."' Schor signaled a retreat from the
public rights doctrine, which the Court then returned to in
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg,' holding that a person has a
right to a jury trial in certain bankruptcy proceedings, which
may not be adjudicated by a non-Article III court.' This line of
cases has "failed to produce a comprehensive set of principles
for determining when a non-Article III tribunal will be held to
be an unconstitutional divestment of judicial power.""
2 The
Court has shown little interest in "doctrinaire reliance on
'4Id. at 546.
55 59 U.S. 272 (1856).
56 Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50,
67-68 (1982) (interpreting Murray's Lessee) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22
(1932)).
57 See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932) (permitting non-Article III
tribunal, the U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, to fact-find through
adjudication of employee's claims against their employers for workplace injuries under
a Federal Act as an "adjunct" of an Article III court when there is sufficient oversight);
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985) (holding that a "public
rights" adjudication chosen by Congress to resolve disputes between private parties
under a federal act need not entail full Article III review).
5 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
59 Id. at 847 (citations omitted).
60 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
6' Although bankruptcy courts are Article I courts rather than agencies, the
concerns raised in Federal Maritime Commission have been applied to them as well.
See Tennessee Student Assistant Corp. v. Hood, 124 S.Ct. 1905 (2004) (holding that
adversary bankruptcy proceedings based on in rem jurisdiction don't implicate state
sovereign immunity); In re Nelson, 301 F.3d 820 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that sovereign
immunity bars adversary proceedings initiated by private parties against states in
bankruptcy court despite Congressional abrogation when in personam jurisdiction).
62 Judge James L. Dennis, Judicial Power and the Administrative State, 62
LA. L. REV. 59, 73 (2001).
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formal categories" but nevertheless insisted that
administrative adjudication could not impinge on "the role of
the independent judiciary within the constitutional scheme of
tripartite government."" The general tenor of these decisions is
that administrative agencies exercise power that overlaps with,
but is distinct from, the power of federal courts, and that an
agency adjudication that does not meet some minimal judicial
safeguards may not stand.'
The Article III cases discussing agency adjudication
demonstrate that the Court regards the use of an agency as a
forum for adjudication as something like necessary evils,
important enough to the function of the executive to exist but
potentially destructive enough to watch over closely.
The next subpart will explore the relationship between
agency adjudication and the separation of powers guarantees of
Article III, and why the Court has chosen to rest in a zone of
uncertainty.
B. "Judicial Power" and the Separation of Powers Doctrine
An administrative agency's adjudication of claims
implicates the structural separation of powers in the U.S.
Constitution. As the previous subpart has shown, the interplay
between the function of agencies and the assumption of judicial
power has been contentious. Several models of the implications
of agency adjudication for separation of powers have been
proposed, and in balancing the interests of litigants and the
structural independence of the judiciary the Court has created
precedent that does not uniformly embrace any of them.
According to the "Simple Model" - the least cumbersome
and least adaptable formulation of "judicial power" - Congress
may not validly assign Article III powers to any adjudicative
bodies other than the federal courts.' As may be expected, the
rigid exclusivity of federal courts propounded by the "Simple
Model" tends to scare off most writers, and the desirability of
administrative agencies typically dissuades attempts to justify
Thomas, 452 U.S. at 582-83, 587; Schor, 478 U.S. at 848, 850.
For agency adjudications, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat'l Res. Def Counsel,
467 U.S. 837 (1984) provides the standard of review. See ABA, A Blackletter Statement
of Administrative Law, 54 ADMIN. L. REv. 17, 38 (2002). Typically, courts must defer to
administrative agency interpretations of law unless, among other things, a court has
spoken on the issue first or a constitutional issue predominates. Id.
Paul M. Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and
Administrative Courts Under Article III, 65 IND. L.J. 233 (1990).
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the model.' Even so, Judge Frank Easterbrook proffers a
sympathetic interpretation of the Simple Model, one which he
asserts coheres with agency adjudication as it is practiced.
7
According to Judge Easterbrook, agencies "mak[e] the decision"
and courts "ensur[e] its conformity to law" - the difference
"between execution and (ultimate) review."' An agency makes
a decision and issues an order, but no exercise of "judicial
power" exists until the order is brought before a court for
enforcement or review. 9
Judge Easterbrook's optimism notwithstanding, the
Court has declined to adopt the "Simple Model" or any other
formalist view of separation of powers in the agency
adjudication context.' This refusal to insist on a strict
separation of powers between the judicial branch and the
executive branch has met with academic approval.
7'
The presumption that some judicial function may be
delegated to courts corresponds to the principle that some
legislative power may be delegated to the executive branch.
The Supreme Court has come to view the strict "non-
delegation" doctrine - the insistence that Congress may not
grant authority to the executive branch to exercise Article II
"legislative powers" - as judicially unsound." The prevailing
66 Richard H. Fallon, Jr, Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and
Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 919-21 (1988) ("[Airticle III literalism [is]
untenable...." because of (1) "extra-textual evidence concerning the framers' intent and
the original understanding" of the article; (2) a frustration of the policy concerns
underlying current administrative procedures; and (3) entrenched practice and case
law precedent supporting administrative adjudication.).
67 Frank H. Easterbrook, "Success" and the Judicial Power, 65 IND. L.J. 277,
278 (1990).
6' Id. at 281.
69 Id. ("All of this is consistent with the Simple Model, without posing the
slightest threat to administrative agencies, bankruptcy judges, and other officers who
decide cases but lack tenure.").
70 In fact, the Court allowed the issue of the relationships between the
branches to grow ambiguous and the grounds for constitutionality of administrative
agencies uncertain. See Harold. H. Bruff, On the Constitutional Status of the
Administrative Agencies, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 491 (1987); see also Peter L. Strauss, The
Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984).
71 See, e.g., M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation
of Powers Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 603 (2001); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., All
About Words: Early Understandings of the "Judicial Power" in Statutory Interpretation,
1776-1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 994 (2001) ("At the time of the constitutional
framing, 'separation of powers' did not mean what it means to neoformalist scholars
and judges today. The framers were functionalist in their orientation, emphasizing
checks and balances more than stringent separation of functions.").
72 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
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rule is that the legislature must provide an "intelligible
principle" to limit expansion of executive power into the
legislative sphere." Although debate about the non-delegation
doctrine refers specifically to the separation of powers between
the legislative and executive branches, the general
understanding of boundaries between branches of government
implicates the judicial branch as well. A formalist construction
of the roles of the branches places the operation of
administrative agencies in jeopardy, and the importance of
agencies to the function of the federal government in the
twentieth century has led courts to indistinct and evasive
treatment of what powers may be shared between the branches
and what constitutional mechanisms allow the exercises of
power to bleed between branches.
Conceivably, some risk of a more formalistic
construction of judicial power exists on the court. In 2001,
Justice Thomas, the architect of the Federal Maritime
Commission opinion, exhibited a nostalgia for the non-
delegation doctrine's concern with the constitutional
formulation of separation of powers." Justice Thomas
portentiously suggested that on some "future day" he would be
willing to reevaluate the Court's retreat from the delegation
doctrine." Many agree with Justice Thomas that the non-
delegation doctrine may have salubrious effects, especially a
stricter accordance with the language and origins of the
constitution." Additionally, the dissent's insistence in Federal
Maritime Association that agencies do not exercise judicial
73 Id. See also Cass Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315,
318 (2000).
74 Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, 531 U.S. 457, 487 (2001)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
Although this Court since 1928 has treated the "intelligible principle"
requirement as the only constitutional limit on congressional grants of power
to administrative agencies, the Constitution does not speak of "intelligible
principles." Rather, it speaks in much simpler terms: "All legislative Powers
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress." . . . I believe that there are
cases in which the principle is intelligible and yet the significance of the
delegated decision is simply too great for the decision to be called anything
other than "legislative."
Id. at 487 (citations omitted).
75 Id.
76 See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV
327 (2002) ('[Tlhose who reject a meaningful nondelegation doctrine .. . should not
pretend to speak in the name of the Constitution.").
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power could itself be read as demanding a less ad hoc,
functional understanding of Article III."
However, the Court has countenanced the limited
delegation of powers to executive agencies by other
governmental agencies because of necessity, and even if the
compromise is not tidy it has been permitted in order to
facilitate agency administration. Part VI will argue that the
special needs of the administrative state should have been
considered and balanced against federalism concerns in
Federal Maritime Commission. Before that, however, the next
two Parts will examine the doctrine of sovereign immunity and
its role in the vision of federalism currently prevailing in the
Court.
IV. THE SOURCE AND NATURE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Justice Thomas, writing for the Federal Maritime
Commission majority, contends that the Founders meant to
reserve immunity to the states as part of the constitutional
plan, but that with Chisholm, state sovereignty fell "into peril"
and the Eleventh Amendment was passed to cure the error.
78
This account of the nature of sovereign immunity
represents the majority's resolution of a debate over the
meaning of the Eleventh Amendment that four justices
79 and
many scholars contest.
Some scholars regard the Eleventh Amendment as
implicitly distinguishing between two sources of federal judicial
power: (1) power over parties (diversity jurisdiction); and (2)
power over federal issues ("arising under" jurisdiction). They
emphasize that the text of the Eleventh Amendment only
withdraws the judicial power over parties and therefore
conclude that the ratifiers intended for the federal judiciary to
retain jurisdiction over issues arising under federal law."
0
Under this "diversity theory" view, Congress may authorize
suits under any substantive area over which Congress has
constitutional power.'
77 Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. 743, 777 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(stating that executive agencies do not exercise judicial power).
78 535 U.S. at 754.
79 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44, 81-83 (1996) (Stevens, J. dissenting); id.
at 101-02 (Souter, J. dissenting).
8o Fallon, supra note 5, at 443.
81 Id.
[Vol. 69:41568
2004] JUDICIAL INCURSIONS INTO EXECUTIVE POWER
The diversity view has a long pedigree, from Chief
Justice Marshall to Justice Souter." Justice Thomas's opinion
in Federal Maritime Commission does not explicitly reject this
view, conceding that to the text of the Eleventh Amendment
merely "address[es] the specific provisions of the Constitution
that had raised concern during the ratification debates and
formed the basis of the Chisholm decision."' But the opinion
insists that the Eleventh Amendment's literal text "does not
define the scope of the State's sovereign immunity, it is but one
particular exemplification of that immunity." In the Court's
current formulation, state sovereign immunity predates the
Eleventh Amendment, the Chisholm decision, and even the
Constitution itself. Thus, the text and the structural
significance of the Eleventh Amendment ultimately have very
little significance.
The Court's reasoning on the issue has drawn fire from
many quarters. The first objection is that it inverts the priority
of congressional action over common law. The principle of state
sovereignty mobilized by the Court may be seen as a common
law principle because it predates the ratification of the
Constitution.85 As such it would seem to be subject to
modification by congressional action, but the Court views it as
"embedded" in the constitution. Moreover, the logic that the
Constitution requires a legislative respect for state immunity
from private suit does not meet with universal approval. The
view that the Constitution mandates state sovereign immunity
has been vigorously challenged by scholars who see the
principle as antiquated, monarchical, and anti-American."
Another criticism of the state sovereignty principle
regards the doctrine as a political tactic useful to the court -
8' The Marshall court, in dealing with the Eleventh Amendment in the wake
of Chisholm, did not arrive at any notion of state sovereignty from it but regarded the
restriction on judicial power as one of personal jurisdiction, not of federal questions.
See John Gibbons, Chief Justice John Marshall and Federalism,16 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 351, 367 (2002) ("Marshall never read the Eleventh Amendment as placing
any limits on the power of Congress to authorize the federal courts to vindicate
federally protected rights against the states."). See also Caleb Nelson, Sovereign
Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1561, 1565-66
(2002)); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 101-02 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 753 (quoting Alden, 527 U.S. at 723).
4 Id.
85 Vicky C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State
Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1 (1988).




mainly for its symbolic value - as a rationale for dismantling
federal enforcement programs. 7  The concern that state
sovereignty serves as a dubious bully pulpit for the federalist
program of the court has been echoed in the press. A New York
Times article published soon after the decision in Federal
Maritime Commission argued that the court went too far by
using an extra-textual constitutional rationale to extend
sovereign immunity to adjudication, putting a hunger for
federalist reform before judicial integrity.'
Another line of objection challenges the "dignity of the
states" language adopted by the Court since Seminole Tribe.'
The precise value safeguarded by the "dignity" of the states is
unclear. If the idea is that states should be protected from
unwarranted federal regulatory or legislative interference, the
concept is difficult - does otherwise constitutional federal law
present the state with an indignity? If the liability of the state
and the cost to the state of defending against a complaint itself
does not injure the state's dignitary interest, what additional
insult is added when the state is named as a defendant in an
action authorized by the federal government and brought by a
private party?
The dissent within the Court has railed against the
program of expanding sovereign immunity since its inception.
In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, which declared
unconstitutional a congressional attempt to authorize suits
against state employers under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), Justice Stevens, joined by
three other Justices, charged that the current doctrine of
sovereign immunity "is so profoundly mistaken and so
fundamentally inconsistent with the Framers' conception of the
87 See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 5, at 482 ("[The best explanation involves path
dependence .... [Tihe Court has learned to deploy sovereign immunity to symbolize
and protect federalism [because it is] practiced and adept in the use of its screwdriver
and as prone to mishap when it wields a hammer.").
8 See Cass Sunstein, A Narrowed Right to Challenge the States, N.Y. TIMES,
May 31 2002, at A23. Sunstein complained that the Supreme Court "has turned state
sovereign immunity into an assault weapon against Congress" and that the Federal
Maritime Commission decision had no historical grounding, the principal of immunity
was unjustified, and "through its own overreaching, the court is diminishing the power
of the president and Congress."
89 Michael Greve identifies three problems with the "dignity" concept
underlying sovereign immunity: 1) the word "dignity" has an indistinct meaning; 2) it
has an unclear constitutional foundation (and potential conflict with federalism); and
3) it has only an instrumental, rather than intrinsic, value. Michael S. Greve,
Federalism's Frontier, 7 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 93, 97-98 (2002).
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constitutional order that it has forsaken any claim to the usual
deference or respect owed to decisions of this court."'
This discussion is relevant to Federal Maritime
Commission in that it suggests that the sovereign immunity
doctrine is most tenuous and vulnerable to the extent that it
covers federal causes of action. This vulnerability increases
when the federal right is not a cause of action per se, but a
statutory right to be heard created by the executive intended to
clarify the scope of a statute like the Shipping Act that clearly
falls within the federal government's regulatory power.
V. FEDERALIST PERSPECTIVES IN THE COURT
A. Dual Federalism and Its Tools
An inquiry into the rationale of Federal Maritime
Commission must take into account the specific theory of
federalism propounded by the majority on the Court. Although
the truism that the Court has been developing a federalist
jurisprudence since the beginning of the 1990s is beyond
dispute, "federalism" is not a monolithic philosophy." In its
broadest formulation, federalism is merely the recognition that
states share power with the federal government. The federalist
revival represents the Court's return from a post New-Deal
judicial tolerance for an expansive role for the federal
government.' "Dual federalism," a term increasingly used by
the Court,3 may be traced back to Edwin Corwin's post New-
Deal critique of the new judicial landscape." Due to the
expansion of the role of the federal government and
irretrievable alterations in jurisprudence, the Court's federalist
revival has not, and could not, signal a return to its pre-New
90 528 U.S. 62, 97-98 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
91 See Ruth Colker & Kevin M. Scott, Dissing States?: Invalidation of State
Action During the Rehnquist Era, 88 VA. L. REV. 1301, 1311 (identifying five
components of federalism within which there are a range of federalist positions, i.e.,
judicial restraint, respect for policies that are important to the states, respect for
separation of powers, protection of voting rights, and "ideological neutrality")
92 See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Narratives of Federalism: Of Continuities and
Comparative Constitutional Experience, 51 DUKE L.J. 223 (2001).
93 See., e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918 (1997); Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991); Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990).




Deal federalism. 5 However, the Court has endeavored to
prevent the federal government from overwhelming the
preferences of the states by focusing attention on the
Constitution's inherent structural limitations on federal power.
The phrase "dual federalism" signals that federal courts must
be solicitous of state autonomy, because when the states
surrendered powers to federal government, they retained a
residuum of "inviolable sovereignty."'
The Court majority's dual federalism relies on a
Madisonian model of double security. 7 Federal government and
state governments exercise powers distinct from one another in
order to prevent either from dominating the other."9 Within
each level of government, the separation of powers between
executive, legislative, and judicial branches forms another
buffer against abuse of power." Ideally, this horizontal and
vertical division works to protect citizens from the tyranny of
government both between and within levels. However, by
characterizing states as remaining co-equal sovereigns in areas
where they did not cede specific powers to the federal
government, the Court has placed particular emphasis on the
federal axis and placed a premium on retained state
sovereignty."
In order to strengthen the structural protections against
federal power, the Court has developed a version of federalism
which aligns itself with various cannons of construction,
including textualism and historical originalism and, more often
than not, with political conservatism." Inevitably, some of the
approaches that federalists on the Court use will fit
uncomfortably with one another.1"' In order to achieve the
95 See generally Robert Post, Federalism in the Taft Court Era: Can it Be
"Revived"?, 51 DUKE L.J. 1513 (2002).
Printz, 521 U.S. at 918.
97 See William H. Pryor Jr., Madison's Double Security: in Defense of




'00 See, e.g., Printz, 521 U.S. at 918-19 (reciting textual and structural
indicators that the Constitution established a system of dual sovereignty).
10' See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Alden v. Maine and the Jurisprudence of
Structure, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1601, 1602 (2000) (noting the common perception
that these positions are interrelated).
102 For example, as William N. Eskridge, Jr. notes in Textualism, the
Unknown Ideal, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509 (1998) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA, A MAI ER
OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997)), Justice Scalia's textualist
approach to statutory interpretation sometimes contrasts with his originalist, but not
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overall goal of balancing federal and state legal interests the
Court must apply different measures to different problems.
However, not all doctrines used by federalists are
equally well-related to the overarching goals of federalism. To
some extent, the Court's effort to limit Congress' legislative
reach to its enumerated powers is a "principled ground" of
federalism."u However, it is possible to distinguish the doctrine
of state sovereignty, which is not as clearly related to the
structure of the Constitution and invites greater charges of
political activism. '
Originalism, the search for the original meaning of the
Constitution, usually as gleaned from an inquiry into the
intent of the Founders, forms a predominant rationale for the
majority in the state sovereignty cases."' Justice Thomas, the
most "thoroughgoing originalist," and Justice Scalia have
espoused originalist views more than other Justices, but in the
area of state sovereignty a slim Court majority consistently
subscribes to the notion that a perdurable sovereignty arose in
the states as a result of the ratifiers' intention to make states
immune from private suits without consent.' 7
The virtue of looking at the Framers' intent when the
text of the Constitution is unclear comes from the conviction
that a fixed and knowable quantum of meaning resides within
necessarily formalist views of constitutional construction. "In Scalia's approach to
issues of constitutional federalism or separation of powers, there is usually little or no
analysis of specific constitutional provisions but much emphasis on general principles
drawn from the overall structure of the document and its history." Id. at 1517.
103 Scott Fruehwald, The Principled and Unprincipled Grounds of the New
Federalism: A Call for Detachment in the Constitutional Adjudication of Federalism, 53
MERCER L. REV. 811, 815 (2002).
l4 See generally id. (arguing that, although federalism works beneficially to
insure state and local governments' role in providing representation to diverse
populations, the Rehnquist court's reasoning in the Alden line of cases is "unprincipled
because it is based on a general conception of state sovereignty that is not in the
Constitution's text").
... See Robert N. Clinton, Original Understanding, Legal Realism, and the
Interpretation of 'This Constitution,' 72 IOWA L. REV. 1177, 1244 (1987); see also
Michael C. Dorf , Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The
Case Of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765 (1997) (exploring explicit and implicit
rationales for originalist constitutional arguments).
106 Doff, supra note 105, at 1813.
107 See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. 706, 734 (1999) ("[Tlhe contours of sovereign
immunity are determined by the Founders' understanding, not by the principles or
limitations derived from natural law."); Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002)
("If the Framers thought it an impermissible affront to a State's dignity to be required
to answer the complaints of private parties' in federal courts,... they would [not] have
found it acceptable to compel a State to do exactly the same thing before the
administrative tribunal of an agency....").
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the Constitution and its history.' 8 Scalia frames his originalism
as an imperfect but necessary choice over a rootless
"nonoriginalism."9 The system is binary: One either clings to
authorial intent in constitutional interpretation, or launches
oneself into subjectivity and indeterminacy.
Even so, positing a unitary intent of the Founders poses
a danger when history suggests no consensus." ° One difficulty
with the state sovereign immunity cases as originalist
decisions is that the Eleventh Amendment construction offered
by the conservative wing of the Court, having no direct textual
moorings, may be seen to constitute a sort of judicial
overreaching."' Because of the difficulty of proving a consistent
intent among ratifiers of the Eleventh Amendment, an
absolutist formulation of that intent with regard to the state
sovereignty question loses the virtue of certainty and descends
into the kind of evil which originalism is intended to
circumvent."' If constitutional principles come not from
structure, history, text, or a unitary intention but from
unfalsifiable notions about what the Founders' silence on the
sovereignty issue must have meant, the sanctity of originalism
slips into the kind of uncertainty about the origins of
constitutional principals which Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas
find so distasteful in other contexts, such as Substantive Due
Process."'
'0' "[Tihere are right and wrong answers to legal questions .... [there are]
clear, eternal principles recognized and put into motion by our founding documents."
Hon. Justice Clarence Thomas, Judging, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (1996).
"o9 See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849,
862-63 (1989).
.. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 768-78 (Souter, J., dissenting) (Justice Souter's
account of "the spectrum of opinion expressed at the ratifying conventions").
' At least one writer goes so far as to accuse the Rehnquist court of a
hypocritical judicial activism. William Marshall says that judicial activism per se is
often justifiable, but the conservative credo of, among other things, judicial restraint,
masks a result-oriented approach with a partisan basis. William P. Marshall,
Conservatives and the Seven Sins of Judicial Activism, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1217, 1244
(2002) ("Originalism is a doctrine of convenience and, even then, not consistently
applied.").
"' The materials used to justify originalist decisions are far-ranging. Some
commentators have pointed to the Court's increasing reliance on extralegal sources,
especially important in the state sovereignty decisions. See, e.g., John J. Hasko,
Persuasion in the Court: Nonlegal Materials in U.S. Supreme Court Opinions, 94 LAW
LIBR. J. 427 (2002). Hasko provides a good sketch of the controversy over whether the
Federalist Papers, a set of documents increasingly cited by courts and the cornerstone
of the sovereignty decisions, have any validity as legal documents. Id. at 434-37.
1 Justice Souter suggests that a natural law rationale informs the originalist
formulation in Alden. 527 U.S. at 763.
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The upshot of this brief meditation on the use of
originalism by the Court is that the image of a unitary intent
among the states at the country's founding is rather
speculative, and draws attention away from a discussion of
federalism policy even as it draws charges of being politically
driven. Beyond being speculative, it may even be
counterfactual."' In the context of federal agency adjudication,
as Part VI will argue, it eclipses more immediate concerns
about whether federal agencies, as executive actors, exercise
judicial power under the constitution.
The presumption used by the court that the sovereign
states did not intend, in ratifying the constitution, to become
subject to proceedings the founders would consider "anomalous
and unheard of"".. converts an inference about federalism
boundaries into an unbudgeable demarcation. In the context of
federal agencies, as discussed above in Part III, the court has
eschewed bright lines. To the end of ultimately weighing the
value of applying an absolutist conception of sovereign
immunity to agencies, the next subpart will briefly discuss the
federalism values at stake for the court in the state sovereignty
context.
B. Preferring States
Although the current Court does not adopt a strict
"state's rights" approach to decentralized government, its has
notably deferred to states in many areas."' State sovereignty
has come to the fore as an area in which the Court has limited
the ability of the federal government to affect states by
authorizing private suits."7 In Federal Maritime Commission,
the Court's decision arguably fails to take the federal interest
in implementing federal policies into full account. The Court
characterizes the federal government, through agency
adjudication, as attempting to take for itself a power that is
"4 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44, 104-06 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(arguing that there was no consensus on sovereign immunity in the ratification
debate); Mark R. Killenbeck, In (re) Dignity: The New Federalism in Perspective, 57
ARK. L. REV. 1, 33 (2004) (arguing that the early sovereign immunity decisions were a
novel response to the political conditions of their times, such as debt to the states,
rather than an application of established principles).
115 Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. 743, 755 (2002) (quoting Hans, 134 U.S. 1, 18
(1890)).
".. See Pryor, supra note 97 at 1177.
117 See supra Part II.A.
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part of the domain of states. Specifically, the federal
government, by authorizing adjudication of private disputes
against states, deprives the state of its power to determine for
itself whether it will consent to such a challenge.
A problem arises in that dual federalism posits a system
of checks between branches, as well as between levels of
government, and state sovereign immunity can sometimes cut
short the federal government's power in areas that it
unquestionably controls. The federal government clearly has
the power to regulate maritime commerce; not only is the
commerce power an enumerated one, but federal maritime
regulation has a venerable history of legitimacy in the Court.
The Federal Maritime Commission was established to help
effectuate the administration of federal regulation of maritime
commerce, and its Commissioners are appointed and removable
by the President.1 '8 The state sovereign immunity doctrine,
taken as an absolute, restricts federal power to entertain
private complaints and thereby administer the Shipping Act in
the manner the federal government chooses.
In response to this, the Court argues that the federal
government may still enforce the Shipping Act through
administrative proceedings, but only by instituting an action
itself.11' This argument flows from Alden and Seminole Tribe.
The sovereign immunity decisions ostensibly do not restrict the
federal government's power to police states' violations of
federal law through litigation, but only its ability to do so
without sufficient public accountability, by allowing the suits to
take place under the names of private parties.2 Expense,
whether to the government or the state, does not affect the
sovereign immunity analysis.12' Neither does the Constitution's
grant of plenary regulatory power over an area impact a state's
immunity.12' In short, the principle of sovereign immunity, as
118 See JACOB A. STEIN ET AL., 1-4 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 4.04(2)(c) (2004).
"9 Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. 743, 768 (2002).
120 "Rather than hiding behind the cloak of lawsuits by private parties, the
federal government can authorize and prosecute its own cases against state
governments. Congress can then openly acknowledge its responsibility for the rising
tax burden and inefficiency caused by that litigation at both the federal and state
levels." Pryor, supra note 97, at 1180 (2002); see also Alden, 527 U.S. 706, 756 (1999)
(stating that the United States may bring a suit against a state, since such a suit
"require[s] the exercise of political responsibility for each suit prosecuted against a
State").
121 Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 765-66.
122 -'(The background principle of state sovereign immunity embodied in the
Eleventh Amendment is not so ephemeral as to dissipate when the subject of the suit is
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derived from the plan of the Constitution under a dual
federalism rubric, shields the states from federal encroachment
whenever private parties initiate any proceeding against an
unwilling state.
VI. THE LOGIC OF FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION
In general terms, the conflict between the majority and
minority in Federal Maritime Commission may be reduced to
the question of: (1) whether an elaborate agency adjudication
may sufficiently resemble a trial so that the adjudication of
private complaints against the state is tantamount to creating
a private right of action in federal courts, or (2) whether the
role of an agency is sufficiently different from that of a court
that the agency does not exercise "judicial power" when it
adjudicates. This Part will argue that the Court's resolution of
this conflict is flawed because the issue of state sovereignty
should not arise before the issue of judicial power and the role
of agencies has been settled.
Justice Thomas begins his analysis in Federal Maritime
Commission with the presumption that a federal agency does
not exercise judicial power when it adjudicates a claim such as
the one brought by Maritime Services, Inc. against the South
Carolina State Ports Authority:
For purposes of this case, we will assume, arguendo, that in
adjudicating complaints filed by private parties under the Shipping
Act, the FMC does not exercise the judicial power of the United
States. Such an assumption, however, does not end our inquiry as
this Court has repeatedly held that the sovereign immunity enjoyed
by the states extends beyond the literal text of the Eleventh
Amendment.123
The reasoning underlying Federal Maritime
Commission suggests that an analysis of whether courts
exercise judicial power becomes unnecessary because state
sovereignty itself is not a jurisdictional matter. According to
Justice Scalia, the text of the Eleventh Amendment gives no
guidance as to whether sovereign immunity applies when a
state is haled before an administrative tribunal because the
Court has "held that the Eleventh Amendment represents just
a reflection of the fact that the States retained that sovereign
an area.., that is under the exclusive control of the Federal Government.'" Id. at 767
(quoting Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996)).
123 535 U.S. at 754.
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immunity that they had before the formation of the Federal
Republic." '24 As understood by the Court, this is the legacy of
Alden. States continue to possess whatever immunities they
regarded themselves as retaining at the time of the ratification
of the Constitution, except that portion of sovereignty that the
plan of the Constitution clearly took from them. The fact that
the Framers could not envision the growth of the
administrative state merely supports the view that the states
could not have intended to cede their sovereignty with respect
to things like administrative adjudication.'25
In Federal Maritime Commission, Justice Thomas
recapitulates the Alden language that "[t]he founding
generation thought it 'neither becoming nor convenient that
the several States of the Union, invested with that large
residuum of sovereignty which had not been delegated to the
United States, should be summoned as defendants to answer
the complaints of private persons." 26 In its earliest use of this
language, which dates back to the nineteenth century, the
Court originally addressed itself to the purpose of the Eleventh
Amendment, and directed its comments exclusively to "judicial
tribunals."' 7 Justice Thomas goes on to say:
[Ihf the framers thought it an impermissible affront to a State's
dignity to be required to answer the complaints of private parties in
federal courts, we cannot imagine that they would have found it
acceptable to compel a State to do exactly the same thing before the
administrative tribunal of an agency, such as the FMC.'
Later in the opinion, Justice Thomas concludes that the
similarities between Federal Maritime Commission
adjudicative proceedings and civil litigation are
24 Transcript of oral argument, Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth.,
535 U.S. 743 (2002) (No. 01-46), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/01-46.pdf.
125 The Harvard Law Review annual summary of leading cases characterizes
the Federal Maritime Commission decision as uncontroversial. The result follows
naturally from the convergence of principals derived from Hans, Alden, and Seminole
Tribe, including: (1) the centrality of state sovereignty to the constitutional scheme; (2)
the broad scope of state sovereign immunity exceeding the literal text of the Eleventh
Amendment; (3) Congress's inability to abrogate sovereign immunity in pursuance of
Article I powers; and (4) states' presumptive immunity from proceedings not envisioned
by the ratifiers of the constitution. Leading Cases, Constitutional Structure, 116 HARV.
L. REv. 210, 218 (2002). The writers find it "unsurprising that the dissenters focused on
issues decided in prior cases." Id.
126 Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 760 (quoting Alden, 527 U.S. 706, 748
(1999)).
1 Ex Parte Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1877).
'28 Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 760.
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"overwhelming" enough to trigger the "Hans presumption" that
the Constitution does not confer power on the government to
authorize "anomalous and unheard of' private proceedings
against a nonconsenting State in order to evade state
sovereignty.20  Federal Maritime Commission adjudication
"walks, talks, and squawks . . . like a lawsuit."'80 This leaves
open the question of whether an agency adjudication that
"walks" less like a lawsuit triggers the sovereign immunity
doctrine.' Does the fact that a private complainant names the
state as a party in any adjudicatory proceeding always offend
the dignity of the state, regardless of the similarity of the
proceeding to a trial? If yes, then the Court's particularized
comparison of the Federal Maritime Commission adjudication
to civil litigation means nothing. If no, then the text of the
Eleventh Amendment matters, and gives a guideline:
Presumably when the administrative law proceeding rises to
such a level of adjudicatory sophistication that it becomes
tantamount to a judicial proceeding, judicial power in the
constitutional sense has come into play.
As this Comment's prior discussion of judicial power in
the context of non-Article III proceedings suggests, the
isolation of judicial power in agency adjudications is no mean
task.'32 And yet the Court has granted agencies significant
latitude in adjudicating claims despite the lack of clarity as to
how the test of Article III limits judicial power to the federal
courts. Justice Breyer, in his dissent, cautions that the Federal
Maritime Commission "decision threatens to deny the
Executive and Legislative Branches of Government the
structural flexibility that the Constitution permits and which
modern government demands."1 3  Breyer's observation points to
the significance of the decision and yet does not fully address
the difficulty that the majority faces, given the sovereign
129 Id. at 755-59.
130 Id. at 751; S.C. State Ports Auth. v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 243 F.3d 165, 174
(2001).
131 At least one observer has raised the possibility that the generality of the
Federal Marine Commission decision will seriously undermine federal environmental
whistleblower statutes, in that any agency adjudication that begins with a state
employee's complaint might be barred even if the agency later intervenes in the
adjudication. Catherine Gainey, Note, Does Sovereign Immunity Bar Administrative
Proceedings Pursuant to Federal Environmental Statutes?, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
227 (2003).
132 See supra Part III.
133 Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 786 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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immunity of states against private suits in courts, in
determining how the interests of states might be undermined.
Justice Thomas dismisses Justice Breyer's charge that
state sovereignty could only apply when a tribunal exercises
"the judicial power of the United States" and that agency
adjudication does not fall within Article III with a deprecatory
comment about a perceived inconsistency in Breyer's position.
"[I]t is ironic that Justice Breyer adopts such a textual
approach in defending the conduct of an independent agency
that itself lacks any textual basis in the constitution."'" It is
true that Justice Breyer draws the contours of "judicial power"
very strictly, arguing that precedent establishes that agencies
exercise Article II rather than Article III powers when
adjudicating. 3' According to Breyer, if adjudicatory activities
are "safeguarded," they are permissible, and only "quasi-
judicial.' 36 As Part III.A. above argued, this is not clear. In fact,
it is just this rigid formalism between judicial power and the
power of other branches that the Court has eschewed in its
"judicial powers" cases. Even so, the question of judicial power
is highly significant. Separation of powers, like the division of
state and federal power, is a basic structural requirement of
the Constitution and, unlike state sovereign immunity, the
identity of judicial power with the federal courts is textually
supported.137
The Court wrongly disregarded the dissent's better
structural reasoning: The issue of state sovereignty under the
Eleventh Amendment is not triggered until a court recognizes
that an agency's adjudication of a private complaint is an
exercise of judicial rather that executive or legislative power.
Turning to sovereignty first disregards the crucial importance
of determining what an agency does, or rather, what type of
constitutional power it exercises. Sovereign immunity clearly
does not protect a state from legislation or executive
enforcement of legitimate federal law. Part of the problem
undoubtedly stems from the imprecise use of juridical
" Id. at 754 n.8.
135 Id. at 773-74 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
136 Id.
137 "The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme
Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1.
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terminology in agency decision-making." But in any event, as
there is no clear intrinsic moment at which the dignity of the
states is harmed outside of Article III courts, the Court should
try to articulate of the precise character of the affront to the
state.
The dignity of the state is not impermissibly injured
merely because a private party brings a claim; if the
government joins and seeks the same relief as the party, there
is no sovereign immunity bar.'39 Nor, apparently, would the
dignity rationale prevent an agency from investigating a
complaint, issuing an injunction against a state, and then
intervening as a party in the adjudication." The majority
claims that the proceedings in question violate the dignity of
the states, and trigger the Hans presumption that sovereign
immunity applies, because of the similarities between the
Federal Maritime Commission proceedings and those of a trial,
including similar pleading rules, discovery procedures, and the
similarity of the role of an ALJ to a trial judge.' The opinion
concedes that there is a "valid distinction between the
authority possessed by the FMC and that of a court" in that the
agency cannot enforce its own orders but must bring them
before a court for enforcement.' However, this is a "distinction
without a meaningful difference" to the Court because the
appearance of the state before the agency is still "coerced,"
since the state loses the ability to litigate the merits of an order
in the court where enforcement is sought, and is also barred
from arguing the merits of an appeal of an Federal Maritime
Commission determination." It seems, then, that the real
injury suffered by the state is in the procedure courts use to
review the agency determination.
18 See William D. Araiza, Agency Adjudication, The Importance of Facts, and
the Limitations of Labels, 57 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 351, 404 (2000) (suggesting that
agency adjudications are not court-like activities, but hybrid creatures, and the project
of courts "attempt[ing] to superimpose... traditional conceptions of judicial action onto
agency adjudication" should be abandoned).
' See Rhode Island Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt. v. United States, 304 F.3d 31, 53-
54 (1st Cir. 2004); Seneca Nation of Indians v. New York, 178 F.3d 958, 97 (2d Cir.
1999); Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 124 F. 3d 904, 913 (8th Cir.
1997).
140 Connecticut Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Safety and Health
Administration, 356 F.3d 226, 234 (2d Cir 2004).
'.' Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. 743,756-60 (2002).




Professor Gordon G. Young has argued that while
Article III jurisprudence has sought to ensure that litigants are
not deprived of a forum lacking constitutional guarantees of
fairness, the doctrine of state sovereign immunity seeks to
secure the absence of any forum whatsoever to litigate private
claims against states. 4 This gives up the game too easily. One
lesson of Schor and other cases in which the court has upheld
administrative adjudication against charges that the executive
tribunal usurped the judicial function of the courts is that the
government's management of complex administrative
programs is a weighty interest whose "practical consequences"
must be balanced against the purposes of Article III, namely,
the independence of the judiciary and the right of litigants to
impartial judges. "' In other words, "bright line rules cannot
effectively be employed to yield broad principles applicable in
all Article III inquiries.4' The needs of an administrative state
exert a gravity that curves the space of structural
constitutional principles when it comes to separation of
powers. 4' There is no reason for the needs of the federal
executive to meet an unyielding wall when the structural
principal is federalism.
The preexisting caselaw governing agency use of judicial
power provides a rubric, if a slightly unsettled one, for
determining the boundaries of agencies' adjudicatory authority
in a way that safeguards the state as a litigant in the ultimate
judicial enforcement action. To the extent that an agency's use
of adjudication in private claims against a state constitutes a
proceeding that would be barred by sovereign immunity if
brought in a court, it should be regarded as an unconstitutional
encroachment on judicial power. The state as a litigant is
doubtless entitled to special safeguards when federalism values
are at stake. Under this approach, it might be said that agency
144 Gordon G. Young, Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State
Ports Authority: Small Iceberg or Just the Tip?, 47 ST. LOUIS L.J. 971, 1012-13 (2003).
Professor Young also concludes that under the immunity jurisprudence preceding
Federal Maritime Commission, the symbolic injury to a state of being named in a
private action for reparations outweighs the policy-making opportunities of agency
adjudication. Id. at 1011-12.
145 See Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848-51 (1986).
' Id. at 857.
147 "In determining the extent to which a given congressional [authorization to
a non-article III tribunal violates Article III], the court has declined to adopt
formalistic & unbending rules. Although such rules might lend a greater degree of
coherence . .. [tihey might also unduly constrict Congress' ability to take needed &
innovative action pursuant to its article I powers." Id. at 851 (citations omitted).
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adjudications constitute an affront to the dignity of the state,
but not until they take on an "inherently judicial function."
The best approach for the court to follow is to balance
the administrative needs of the federal government with
protection of states through process, which is to say, by
guaranteeing procedural safeguards. This may be done without
drawing agency proceedings themselves into the net of the
doctrine of sovereign immunity. Justice Breyer offers the sound
suggestion that the Constitution might be read to require full
review of an agency order rendered against a state in a
subsequent enforcement action when the agency is not a party
in the initial adjudication. " Other potential curbs might
include a limitation of the remedy a state may seek in an
enforcement action when the agency's order was issued
pursuant to a private party's claim, by, for example, not
enforcing reparations but permitting injunctive relief.
The Court could begin to articulate a level at which an
administrative adjudication of a private party's complaint
against a state, even when authorized by valid regulations,
assumes such "essential attributes of judicial power" that a
court could not approve any order issued through the
adjudication. This rule might be based on the rationale that the
court could not approve a proceeding that it itself would have
conducted but for the Eleventh Amendment's jurisdictional bar.
The final piece of the puzzle is to answer why it matters
whether the agency adjudication is barred by sovereign
immunity or limited, perhaps drastically, by procedural
safeguards. Part of the answer must remain speculative.
Although the ultimate consequences of applying state
sovereign immunity to administrative agencies are still not
clear, Federal Maritime Commission has already impacted a
number of agency proceedings, most notably those seeking to
enforce whistle blowing statutes. "9 The primary difference,
148 Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 784-85 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
149 See, e.g., Rhode Island Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt. v. U.S., 304 F.3d 31 (1st Cir.
2002) (holding that whistleblower complaint under Solid Waste Disposal act was
barred by sovereign immunity when brought by private party against state);
Connecticut Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Occupational Safety and Health Admin., 138 F.
Supp. 2d 285, (D. Conn. 2001) (holding that filing by private party of OSHA
whistleblower complaint against state was barred by sovereign immunity); Cannamela
v. Georgia Dep't of Nat'l Res., No. 02-106, 2003 WL 22312735 (Dep't of Labor Adm.
Rev. Bd. Sept. 30, 2003) (finding that proceeding before Department of Justice
Administrative Law Judge based on private whistleblowing complaint under CERCLA
and SWDA was barred by sovereign immunity). But see Tennessee v. United States
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however, is that judicial review of procedures is a more flexible
posture than a dismissal for sovereign immunity. A court can
preclude a specific remedy, or construe the statute establishing
the agency procedures as requiring different constitutional
protections for states - and thereby preserve the general
scheme of enforcement with special limitations for agencies.
The characterization of certain types of adjudication as being
barred by sovereign immunity skews the debate, coloring
adjudication in general as an invalid scheme for regulatory
policymaking when states are likely to be among the parties
violating federal law. It leaves a great deal of uncertainty, and
even apprehension, about what measures of formal and
informal adjudication might stand. '
Most importantly, however, the decision shows a
doctrinal disregard for the value of agencies and the difference
between the constitutional character of agency adjudication
and judicial trials. The central role of courts is to decide
disputes between parties. '1 The fundamental role of agencies is
to clarify and administer the statutes that enable them.
Although there is value in a federal system in curbing the
excessive zeal of federal agencies that may impact negatively
on states, their independence from the courts is a byproduct of
the fact that they are necessary for the administration of
federal law in a mature and developed federal system.
VII. CONCLUSION
The application of state sovereignty to the area of
administrative adjudication underscores the willingness of the
current Court to put the principle of federalism first even in
contexts which the Federalists themselves could not have
envisioned. The court has recognized that agencies, non-
existent at the birth of the country, now serve a salutary and
even necessary function which has been preserved through
decades of complicated Constitutional inquiry into the nature
Dep't of Transp, 326 F.3d (6th Cir. 2003) (finding DOT's statutory process was not
adjudication barred by sovereign immunity).
'50 See Young supra note 144, at 1023 (expressing reservations about the
future applications of Federal Maritime Commission even though generally supportive
of the reasoning of the decision).
'5' See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) ("The Article III judicial
power exists only to redress or otherwise protect against injury to the complaining
party. .. ."); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) ("The province of
the court is solely to decide the rights of individuals .... ).
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of an agency's relationship to judicial power when it hears
private claims. The fact that a claim is against a state could
and should have been evaluated in terms of the appropriate
scope of the involvement of the federal branches of government
in their relationships with states. Although the interests of
federalism may counsel against an unlimited ability of agencies
to hear private claims, it should not have imposed an absolute
bar through the doctrine of sovereign immunity. By
invalidating the Federal Maritime Commission's ability to
monitor state compliance with the Shipping Act, the Court has
arrogated to the judiciary the power to control means of
administration of the law, thereby impeding the executive and
legislature from arriving at fair and efficient means of
implementing legitimate congressional programs.
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